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The incoming Labour government of 1997 committed itself to open an institution 
called NICE in the White Paper on the future of the NHS which it rushed out in 
December of that year. There was little detail: essentially a paragraph, which said 
the goal was to further clinical and cost-effectiveness, drawing up new guidelines, 
and bringing together existing DH-funded guidelines programmes. NICE, it was 
claimed, would promote consistency and equity in access to services: Labour 
politicians emphasised how NICE would put an end to the ‘postcode lottery’. But 
there was no mention of Health Technology Assessment or reference to the 
appraisal of drugs. This was to be fleshed out in publications over the next two 
years. 
Just how the plans for NICE developed between May 1997 and the Institute’s 
opening in April 1999 makes a fascinating study in policy development. We hope 
today’s witness seminar will shed more light on the process. Some things are clear. 
Labour did not come to power with a blueprint for the NHS (let alone for NICE in 
particular). Simon Stevens (who had been adviser to Labour opposition health 
spokesman Chris Smith before becoming Frank Dobson’s special adviser) certainly 
arrived with some ideas about the need to assess the cost-effectiveness of 
innovations but there is no sign (so far) that he was thinking of any particular 
institutional form to implement these. 
Similarly, DH officials had already been working for the outgoing Conservative 
Ministers on initiatives such as an expert working group with academic health 
economists and the pharmaceutical industry on how the cost-effectiveness of drugs 
should be evaluated. This work is an example of the important role played in DH 
policy development at this time by the Economic Advisor’s Office (under the late 
Clive Smee).  
The roots of such work lie several years further back, in DH’s constant concern 
about the mounting cost of the NHS and the need to find politically acceptable ways 
of getting it under control. Many options had been discussed during the 1990s, 
officially and otherwise: the approach which found most favour with Smee and his 
colleagues was to make use of the methods of health economics to prioritise 
spending on those activities which could be shown to deliver the most health gain. 
The Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY), developed in the 1970s and 1980s, was by 
1997 being seen by most health economists as the best available measure of this. 
The Health Technology Appraisal (HTA) Programme, established in 1993 and first 
operated as part of NHS R&D, was one concrete expression of this policy direction. 
Any policy to constrain clinicians’ freedom about what treatments they could select 
was of course controversial – much more so in the 1990s than today, when (thanks 
in part to NICE) guidelines are a more normal and accepted part of clinical life. Fear 
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of medical opposition meant that pre-1997 governments were highly circumspect 
about any steps beyond producing guidelines. The word ‘rationing’ came to be 
loosely applied to any such policy (although Rudolf Klein and colleagues argue that 
the word is best reserved for talking about allocations to individuals at the point of 
delivery). Rationing became a word which first Stephen Dorrell (Secretary of State 
1995-97) and then Alan Milburn (Minister of State 1997-98 and Secretary of State 
1999-2003) felt the need to avoid. 
If NICE, its role and its methods were designed partly by Simon Stevens and partly 
by DH officials, another important part in defining NICE was certainly played by NICE 
itself. DH’s policy documents and NICE’s Establishment Order provided a skeleton: 
Mike Rawlins, Andrew Dillon and their tiny initial staff team also did a lot to put the 
flesh on it. Mike was appointed in September 1998: Andrew not until almost the 
moment NICE’s official existence began in April 1999 (he did not arrive on the payroll 
until July, along with NICE’s other initial employee, the Communications Director 
Anne-Toni Rodgers). 
NICE brought together three related activities: publishing evidence-based clinical 
guidelines, promoting better – and more equal – access to new treatments 
(overcoming the ‘postcode lottery’), and controlling the cost of NHS care by 
preventing expenditure on treatments which appeared to offer poor value for money. 
What gave NICE its eventual character was the decision to combine them as the 
functions of a single body, and the precise ways they were combined.  
NICE did not invent guidelines: indeed Martin Eccles has told us one of his roles was 
to reduce the number being produced (by stopping the low-quality ones). But 
guidelines informed by evidence about cost-effectiveness as well as (clinical) 
effectiveness were a relatively new departure and certainly not an intrinsic part of the 
evidence-based medicine movement, some of whom were actively opposed to this. 
NICE promoted a particular kind of methodological rigour in guideline production, 
and allowed those which met the standard to use the NHS branding which (and this 
is easily overlooked) had itself only been invented in 1997. We were told that Mike 
Rawlins always maintained that ‘it’s guidelines that NICE will be known for,’ and that 
Andrew Dillon, too, regarded them as even more important than the Technology 
Appraisals which attracted nearly all the headlines. 
NICE would only improve access to new drugs if the NHS complied with its guidance 
that a new therapy ought to be adopted. This was not a foregone conclusion at first, 
but in January 2002 the funding direction, that NHS commissioners had to pay for 
treatments approved by NICE, made it more of a reality. Until then, the extra time 
spent getting a drug approved by NICE did not necessarily hasten its use in the 
NHS. As Evan Harris, the Liberal Democrat health spokesman, put it in 1999, the 
discussion paper about how NICE would work called ‘"Faster Access to Modern 
Treatment" … follows the trend of giving Government papers titles whose contents 
belie them’. 
The third goal, that of saving the NHS money, was not as easy to present in an 
attractive light: it amounted to denying market access to drugs known to be effective, 
on the grounds that they had failed a ‘fourth hurdle’ (alongside safety, quality and 
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efficacy): the test of cost-effectiveness. Political opponents were not slow to point 
this out. In March 1999 Philip Hammond, then Conservative spokesman on health, 
told the Commons that NICE’s ‘prime purpose will be seen as providing a fig leaf for 
Government in rationing health care, while continuing to deny that such rationing 
exists.’ 
Starting work in April 1999 with a Board of twelve but no paid staff, empty premises 
and little else, NICE’s first job was to create itself; to define its role, and, in Andrew 
Dillon’s words, then ‘to do what we say we are going to do.’ Establishing the infant 
organisation’s credibility with existing powerful players like Royal Colleges and drug 
companies, with the press, patient organisations and the public, was among the 
most important tasks. As Andrew described it, ‘we … talked ourselves almost into 
the ground in order to explain what we are about.’ NICE’s Partners Council, on which 
all the major stakeholders came together, was one important forum for this, but there 
were very many discussions beyond it as well. 
Taking over the existing DH funding of Royal Colleges for guideline production, NICE 
established six collaborating centres for guidelines. It took DH until November 1999 
to approve NICE’s programme of guidelines production. In April 2001 the first NICE 
guidelines, on prophylaxis for myocardial infarction and pressure ulcer risk 
assessment and prevention, were published. While most of NICE’s early activities 
were about setting up and operating the systems to produce guidelines and 
Technology Appraisals, other work included the running of pre-existing programmes 
such as Confidential Enquiries (for example into perioperative deaths) and support 
for clinical audit. 
Technology Appraisals were NICE’s baptism of fire: the famous Relenza (zanamivir) 
appraisal, commissioned in July 1999 and published in October, was its first, and 
had to be conducted under a process that was still being designed – though the 
manufacturers, Glaxo Wellcome, gave their consent to this ‘prototype’ approach. 
Relenza, as is well known, immediately became a test of NICE’s independence from 
government and its resolve to follow the evidence. It was a test NICE passed, 
standing up to Glaxo’s and Richard Sykes’ lobbying of the Prime Minister, threats of 
judicial review and relocation of manufacturing out of the UK. It could equally be said 
that the government passed a test of its willingness to let NICE make its own 
decisions. The Relenza decision was a one-off: the first ‘full’ Technology Appraisal, 
on the removal of wisdom teeth, emerged in March 2000. 20 more Technology 
Appraisals followed in NICE’s second year of life, including hip prostheses, taxanes 
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Areas for discussion and seminar format 
 
The aim of this witness seminar was to bring together those who were directly 
involved in the emergence of NICE or experienced it first hand, and re-examine this 
important moment in the history of the NHS. It was chaired by Nick Timmins, who 
invited selected participants to speak on the main areas of discussion outlined 
below. The discussion in each stage was then widened to take questions and 
comments from any participant. 
 
Roots 
In 1997-99, what did you think that NICE was for? (Producing better guidelines? 
Improving equity of access to medicines/ending the postcode lottery? 
Rationing/ensuring the NHS spent its resources where health gain was maximised? 
Something else?) 
Whose thinking influenced you most at this time? (Either individuals or groups, e.g. 
‘health economists’?) 
How important do you feel the health economists were, in particular? Who stands out 
among them, and for what? 
Which politicians (if any) played a major role in shaping NICE? What was their 
contribution? 
What did other interests hope to see happening in this field? (E.g. Royal Colleges, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, patient groups?) 
What influence did existing structures, like Colleges’ guidelines teams, or the NHS 
Health Technology Assessment Programme, or Drug Evaluation Committees, have 
on the shape of NICE? 
How would you assess the legacy of the pre-1997 Conservative governments in this 
area? How much did it influence subsequent developments? 
 
First months: what did NICE want to become? 
Which parts of the functions, and form, of NICE were laid down by DH and which did 
NICE design for itself? 
What had Mike Rawlins already decided by the time the first NICE Board was 
appointed in April 1999? 
How did the balance emerge in NICE’s appraisal method between applying a health 
economics tool and reflecting social value judgments? 
What went according to plan and what was unexpected? 
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First months: what did others want NICE to become? 
What did the pharmaceutical industry want to happen in 1999 and immediately after? 
Were they trying to undermine NICE or to shape it? IF they were hoping to shape it, 
into what? 
What did patients’ and carers’ organisations want? What did they think of NICE? Did 
they find it open to engagement with them? 
 
Working at NICE in its early days 
What was it like to work at NICE in 1999-2002? What was the atmosphere? What 
was a ‘typical working day’ like? 
NICE attracted some impressive people, to both its Board and its staff. How? What 
made them come? 





Witness Seminar Transcript 
 
NT: I’m going to reorder the questions marginally, let’s start with this very broad one, 
which is, in the period 1997-1999, when NICE was being set up, what did you think 
NICE was for? Who would like to start on that? 
 
MR: Shall I start off? Mike Rawlins here, well, it wasn’t really conceived in the period 
of the Conservative government,  and when it was conceived it was sort of laid out in 
A First Class Service, which had originally two functions, one was to look at the 
clinical economy and effectiveness of interventions, especially new interventions, 
and secondly to produce evidence-based clinical guidelines.1 
 
[01:05] NT: Yes, there was a lot of talk at the time about rationing and postcode 
lotteries. [interruption] 
 
[01:29] MR: Yes, they are two rather separate things actually, the postcode lottery 
was a problem of some hospitals were able, willing to provide particular treatments, 
particularly the beta interferon for multiple sclerosis, and others weren’t, and it sort of 
depended on where you lived, which side of the street, which hospital was 
responsible for your care. That was a postcode lottery. Rationing was something 
rather different, and I always said at the time that NICE wasn’t in the business of 
rationing, I remember rationing from my childhood, everyone got ten sweets per 
week, it didn’t matter if you were fat or thin or whatever it was, you all got the same – 
that was rationing. Somewhere in a box somewhere I have still got my old ration 
book from the 1940s. It was rather different, and NICE was never into rationing, as I 
tried to explain right at the very beginning. 
 
[02:29] NT: Anybody want to comment on that? 
 
[02:43] TC: Well I don’t think I really ever changed my views about what I conceived 
NICE to be from the moment when Mike asked me to join him as vice-chair of the 
board. I had been involved in arguments about rationing and things like this for many 
years, I saw NICE as a great opportunity for rational decisions favouring population 
health… I had also been very much influenced by Archie Cochrane and 
 
1 Department of Health, A First Class Service: Quality in the new NHS (1998) 
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subsequently by the Canadians at McMaster, with the what was then called, some 
people still call it, the evidence-based medicine movement.2 It seemed to me that if 
you do accept the basic premise of those epidemiologists and clinicians, that the 
object of health services is to improve the health of the population then it seems to 
me that… that leads very quickly to some notion of cost-effectiveness, criterion for 
deciding what in general is going to be made available for that population, and I 
admit that it immediately struck me that NICE could be developed into an instrument 
that was fit for that purpose.  
 
That was what I conceive of NICE, what attracted me to it, was to make sure that as 
far as possible the economics was going to be respectable, to economists. Of course 
I could see that there were many people who would feel threatened by the existence 
of NICE, and although the economists in particular wouldn’t feel threatened by it, but 
they would love to pounce on anything that was not correct, or was a 
misunderstanding, or an abuse of standard welfare economics. My concern then, 
was very much what Mike and I had as a recurring theme I think: it was about 
credibility, it became terribly important that as far as I was concerned, while other 
people would handle the epidemiology, I was there to monitor the credibility of the 
economics. Those are the two things that concerned me; NICE to be an instrument 
for a more efficient health service that had a better impact on the people’s health for 




[05:22] AS: In your question you’ve got ‘rationing’ and then ‘forward slash’ ‘ensuring 
NHS spends its resources where health gain was maximised’. In other words, not 
wasting. And I always thought that that was at the centre of it, certainly with the 
health technology appraisals preceding guidelines on the whole. In the days, years 
rather, before NICE, in the eighties and nineties, something extraordinary happened 
to drug prices. So there were people researching this, how far it went and what the 
explanation was, but certainly during the seventies and early eighties, new drugs 
used to be priced not so very differently from other things you might buy from a 
chemist. It wasn’t a problem. The problem certainly arose before NICE was 
established, which was why a whole number of regional Development and 
Evaluation Committees were set up, and their principle objective was to try and work 
whether new drugs were cost-effective.  
 
2 Archie Cochrane, first leading UK advocate of what was called ‘evidence-based medicine’. 
David Sackett and Brian Haynes at McMaster University, Canada, were other important 
figures in this movement. 
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What they didn’t have was the power to affect those prices, so if you get into the 
language of making sure that the NHS has got cost-effective interventions, one of 
the things you can do about them is not so much ration, as negotiate. Insofar as 
NICE was involved in these appraisals early on, there wasn’t that much negotiation 
from the pharma industry, but we’ll come back to that later, so there certainly was a 
big element of making sure the NHS spent its resources where health gain was 
maximised. The issue of ‘what did anybody think NICE was for?’ certainly for those 
of us who had come from the Regional Health Authorities and their attached 
institutes were familiar with what Development and Evaluation Committees did, there 
was certainly an expectation that NICE would do that nationally and with much more 
clout. And in fact that’s sort of how it turned out. 
 
[07:30] NT: Andrew are you saying that there was a change in the nature of drug 
pricing over the eighties and nineties? So, what was it? 
 
[07:39] AS: I’m not a total expert on this, but in retrospect you can tell, A, from 
looking at the data, and B, from the experience that several of us had, with things 
like beta interferon, which although appraised by NICE had hit the decks a couple of 
years before, maybe even a couple of years before that.3 And everybody was 
shocked that they were ten thousand pounds per patient, per year, before we had 
seen that sort of pricing with drugs for rare illnesses. Beta-interferon and one or two 
others – I’ve got a sort of folder of them somewhere – were a real shock, at what 
was the justification for this pricing? Insight into what goes on in pharmaceutical 
company boardrooms isn’t mine, but I’m sure some sea-change took place. 
 
[08:31] NT: Trevor, what’s your view on that? 
 
[08:34] TJ: Okay, so before NICE was, and actually in its early years, until recently, 
we had something called the PPRS, the pharmaceutical price regulation scheme. 
Those of you who are familiar with it, it meant that our industry could earn no more 
than the average profit of all the other industries, aerospace, mining, banking and so 
on – in other words we weren’t given a favoured position, but we could make a profit, 
an average profit. What that meant was, if we invested heavily in R&D and 
manufacture in the UK, obviously you could offset that as part of your profit. Equally, 
by setting a price for a product you were going to export higher than you would have 
done in the UK and discounting it for cheap products in the UK, we were then able to 
 
3 Beta interferon, a drug licensed in the UK for multiple sclerosis in 1995. 
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get a very favourable balance of trade in pharmaceuticals, in the time of NICE it was 
£2.6 billion.  
 
So here was an inventive scheme that the government and industry work hard on, to 
actually make sure that the industry was getting incentives to invest here, and the 
country was getting the benefit of balance of trade,  and that is really important thing 
to remember when, at that time, the drugs bill accounted for twelve per cent of total 
NHS spend, very much lower than most services in the NHS, and the prices of 
pharmaceuticals then, as now, were much lower than they were in places like 
Germany, Italy and Spain.  
 
[10:10] NT: David, you raised your hand? 
 
[10:10] DP: Without wanting to disagree with anything that has been said, I think also 
it is worth commenting on the political circumstances of 1997. There were various 
people who wanted a body like NICE to exist, for reasons that are reflected in the 
way it was set up. But in 1997 you had the landslide Labour victory, and you had the 
prospect that the NHS was going to continue to be a painful headache for ministers 
and politicians, because there were blockbuster drugs, there was a rising interest in 
clinical cost-effectiveness, and there was postcode-prescribing, evidence-based 
medicine was not actually making the politicians’ job any easier, it was making it 
worse, because decisions were being made in the NHS to not provide treatments, 
and ministers were being – people were trying to hold ministers accountable for what 
was going on.  
 
So I think the political reasons were in some ways quite negative, issues of clinical 
cost-effectiveness and evidence-based medicine, which are two different things but 
with an overlap, could stop at NICE, and not go up to the minister’s desk. Although 
the incoming Labour government did not have NICE within its manifesto, the NHS, or 
the concept of the NHS actually being valued and the quality of the NHS services 
becoming something the country could be proud of rather than ashamed of, was very 
much part of the Labour agenda. 
 
[12:02] NT: I do remember when beta interferon first appeared, Gerry Malone’s day, 
minster for health, just being shocked at the price, it felt enormous.4  
 




[12:17] TJ: When you have a big, blockbuster pharmaceutical in a big disease that is 
one thing, but many of the lessons we are seeing today, in personalised medicine 
and rare diseases, were true at the time of beta-interferon, which I also developed at 
Wellcome. For example, when I developed, with my team, AZT for the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS, we had no idea how many people would have the infection. We priced the 
drug to get a return out of our investment, as it turned out I think we got the price 
wrong, especially for the developing world, but you can’t at that stage know what the 
potential revenue is going to be – so you tend to say ‘how am I going to get a 
reasonable return on my investment at a reasonable price?’ And then the willingness 
to pay of the payer. 
 
[13:13] NT: I’m sure that is a point we will come back to. One of the things that the 
industry found helpful found helpful with NICE was that when it did make a 
recommendation, although it wasn’t perfect, the NHS did tend to take the products 
up more swiftly… 
 
[13:27] TJ: I do remember at the first conference, or second conference of NICE, that 
I was invited to on the platform with Michael, I asked him the question of ‘what will 
you do then, now you have made these decisions, if they are not taken up by all the 
patients who are entitled to them in the National Health Service?’ and Michael’s reply 
was ‘I will chase them to the ends of the lands’ 
 
[13:54] NT: We have slightly touched on this, but a shifting order of questions, how 
much – NICE was clearly Labour’s creation, but how much was there a legacy from 
the previous Conservative government? 
 
[14:13] MR: Very little, in fact. Very little indeed, and although, Gerry Malone did say 
to me once, some years after NICE had been established, that he never had the idea 
of NICE but he did recognise when he was a minister that something needed to be 
done, and it couldn’t go on as it was, but they didn’t really have anything to offer on 
it. It was really as a result of… also remember that when Labour came to power in 
1997, they promised to use the same sort of budgets that had been previously set by 
Ken Clarke, they weren’t increasing expenditure, so they had a problem.5 
 
[15:13] NT: There was Gerry Malone’s famous explosion at the end of the first beta-
interferon episode, when he said to his civil servants ‘this is not a decision that 
 




should ever reach a minister’s desk again’ ‘try and find me a mechanism that will 
avoid that.’ 
 
[15:30] MR: As he said to me, he reminded me that, he also said that I didn’t actually 
have the idea of NICE. 
 
[15:42] NT: I think that’s true, it might be worth pointing out that Clive Smee, in 1996 
had had an away study trip to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and I think the 
States, and had come back to say that we were off the pace in terms of doing cost-
evaluations of new pharmaceuticals, and was putting papers around the department 
about that.6 And Tony, ahead of Labour winning power, you were chairing this expert 
workshop on pharmaceutical guidelines and cost-effectiveness. These weren’t NICE, 
but they were sort of steps towards it, is that fair? 
 
[16:26] TC: We took it over, when we were developing NICE’s methodology for 
technology appraisals, we really used that as a jumping-off point. I think a lot of our 
initial workshops were centred on the sort of recommendations that had been 
coming out of that working party. At the time, it was one of those great occasions 
where it seemed to be quite easy to reach consensus about the sort of principles that 
should be used. We had all four of the industry health economists in that group, and 
they were as keen as everybody else to get this right.  
 
[17:14] NT: David, your hand was up? 
 
[17:14] DP: I was going to say that, because I was working for the previous 
administration as well, I think NICE benefitted from programs that were funded by 
the previous government, some of which have been mentioned, from Clive Smee’s 
work in particular, and the development of evaluation committees and there was a 
national clinical guidelines program. But under the previous administration, the 
notion that that should all come together in a national body was a complete non-
starter, I say that as someone who was working for the previous administration and 
would have liked NICE to be created a lot earlier. But there was just no way a 
government body such as NICE was going to come into being, perhaps the 
government would have smiled on a professional body such as NICE coming into 
being, but that wasn’t going to happen either, because the professional leaders were 
never going to set up such a body. 
 
6 Clive Smee, Chief Economic Adviser, Department of Health 1984-2002. 
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[18:15] NT: Yes, the concept of a national body was sort of antithetical to the nature 
of Conservatism at that time I think. 
 
[18:22] DP: Yes, quite so.  
 
TC: I think it was also antithetical to a majority, or clearly a substantial chunk of the 
clinical professions as well. It was seen – there was a lot of discussion in the late 
90s, mostly in the rationing context, around limiting clinical freedom: what is clinical 
freedom? Is it clinical license to do anything? And of course the whole business of 
best practice, identifying best practice and using guidelines, guidance documents to 
help physicians to engage in effective healthcare. It was very much to the fore. It 
wasn’t just a political thing, it is absolutely true that there was that, but the medical 
professions too, or some parts, probably the parts that are hard to reach, who hadn’t 
discovered evidence-based medicine, were sceptical and saw NICE as a threat.  
 
Which again raised the hugely important question of credibility, from the beginning 
we realised that in view of the fact that there might be opposition from a number of 
quarters, how do we make sure that what we create here is going to survive a 
possible change of government, how do we make sure that it does prove to be 
acceptable to clinicians, and in particular to clinical teachers in the medical schools, 
And how do we make sure that it is acceptable to the research community, who, 
after all, is the bunch of people who are going to be providing the evidence that we 
subsequently have to use in technology appraisals and to underpin guidelines. 
 
[20:27] NT: Which groups did you see as being most influential behind NICE, health 
economists, obviously? 
 
[20:40] MR: Well it wasn’t all health economists, and I’ll share his blushes but it was 
Tony, Tony Culyer who was absolutely critical to the whole thing. It was 
extraordinary the way he… and it was really Tony who told us we should use 
QALYs. 
 
[21:04] TC: Very nice of you to say that Mike, but the business of, I think the 
business at the time we were creating NICE, the business of persuading the then-
opposition, the Tory opposition was very much Mike’s doing, I had very little to do 
with that, but Mike was so diligent, it was very important, because it would be quite 
easy to imagine that NICE would be a Labour baby – there was a wonderful cartoon 
in the BMJ that had Tony Blair as a puppeteer manipulating NICE. 
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[21:47] MR: I’ve still got it on my wall 
 
[21:52] TC: You’ve got it on your wall? Being only infinitely inferior to you, Mike, I 
have only a photocopy of it on my wall 
 
[22:02] NT: In terms of what other influences… in the run up to NICE, Trevor, what 
was the industry’s view of all this?’ 
 
[22:13] TJ: Well we had the situation of having in the UK an extremely well-respected 
and good regulation agency, the MHRA, still is the case.7 Their job was to look at 
quality, safety and efficacy, and we feared that imposing another hurdle of cost-
effectiveness would actually delay entry of these products to the patients, and delay 
return of investment. Around the patch, there were countries in Europe fixing prices, 
you had to negotiate a price on entry, and that process took about a year, at least, 
for most countries, sometimes more. From the time, in the UK, that you got MHRA 
approval you could go straight into the market and get patient benefit and return on 
investment.  
 
The fear we had was that there would be a further delay of us to a year or more, 
that’s not good for the patients or the industry, and furthermore, when do you really 
know the cost-effectiveness and value of a new product? Clinical trials in those days 
took place on a few hundreds, maybe a few thousands, at times, of patients, but they 
were all with massive exclusion criteria, so when you get to the real world and the 
real patient with other therapies, it is only after some time in that situation that you 
get to judge what the real benefit is and the value, and we were very concerned that 
that would, actually, again, get a false reading at the start of the activity. So the 
concern was delay – of access, delay of return on investment, and an imprecise 
judgement at the beginning of the life of the product as to its value. 
 
[24:00] NT: Mercy, can you give us a view on - clearly it won’t have been unanimous 
-  but what the view of patient groups was, as this was coming over the horizon? 
 
[24:10] MJ: Well I think, as I read A First Class Service, we had a lot of questions 
about what was the patient involvement? It did mention the patients, but it didn’t 
have, obviously it was a White Paper, there was no detail, so we had lots of 
questions. Also, our pharmaceutical colleagues were talking about the fourth hurdle, 
 
7 MHRA: the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 
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as well. I think there were concerns, at the same time we knew about postcode 
lottery and access to particular drugs, so certainly from my point of view and talking 
to other patients’ groups at the time, it was just a series of questions; what was this 
body? What did they mean that they were going to be more involved with patients?  
 
In fact, I remember when the paper first came out, and I had to give a talk at a 
seminar for the pharmaceutical companies, and Charles Dobson was one of the 
other speakers, he was obviously in the department, working on NICE, I think I just 
did a series of questions about actually what was the involvement of patients?8 What 
did all this mean? I got a call from the Department of Health asking me to join the 
Partners Council. So I always think it was that seminar, my asking if patients were 
going to be involved in this, that I got involved with the board, and at that point I was 
just about leaving the National Eczema Society, I was about to take up my first CEO 
role in another charity, and I thought ‘I can’t represent the National Eczema Society, 
I’m about to leave’ and what I was told was ‘we want you as an individual, it doesn’t 
matter who you are working for’ and what I had found when I went on to the partners 
council, was that about a third, no a quarter, of the council was patient 
representatives, either organizations representing patients or, like me, three other 
individual patients reps, which was so unusual.  
 
By then I had been working in health charities for quite some time, and it was very 
difficult to get a seat at the table, and suddenly we were on the advisory committee 
to this new organisation helping to shape what they were going to be, and what was 
quite impressive, being quite cynical at the time – having been round tables where 
nobody was listening – was that when we made suggestions they were actually 
acted upon, one of the first things that was suggested was there should be a patient 
representative on the appeals panels that had just been set up for technology 
appraisals. I remember Andrew you saying ‘oh yes, I will take that to the lawyer’ and 
before I knew it I was one of the patient reps on it. So I really found that we had 
loads of questions going in, but quite quickly NICE was showing it was more patient-
focused, and our cynicism before … [27:36 unclear], so yes, that was my experience 
of it. 
 
[27:40] NT: Can I ask, we have already talked about the medical profession in 
particular, and its varied attitude to this. Does anyone  have a sense of whether the 
Royal Colleges were in favour of the creation of NICE, did they, David? 
 
 




[28:00] MR: They were okay actually, it was slightly awkward because the 
government had very little money to give us, and most of the money that we had to 
start with was money that had previously been given to the colleges under the terms 
of clinical effectiveness research or something like that. It was given by the Thatcher 
government in order to buy the colleges off when there was some particular row 
going on, and the first thing, one of the first jobs I had to do was to tell the Royal 
Colleges that the clinical effectiveness research money that they used to have, they 
weren’t going to get it any more, it was all coming to NICE. However, I bought them 
off by getting them to take a major role in developing the guidelines, so they in a 
sense had the money back, so it was okay. The BMA was okay.9 The outfit who was 
not okay, and you will probably come onto it, was Richard Smith at the BMJ, he was 
quite heavily opposed to us and very critical for the first few years.10 
 
[29:20] NT: Paul? 
 
[29:26] PA: I was just going to throw in here that one of our interviewees, almost 
certainly David, who can comment on whether it really was him, said that NICE 
simply wasn’t on most Colleges’ radar until it was too late for them to work out what 
was happening, is that right David? 
 
[29:38] DP: Yes, I mean, I was thinking that the period between the white paper, 
when NICE was a paragraph as I recall, and the legislation and the regulations and 
the birth of NICE, was characterised by not having a lot of formal inclusion 
mechanisms whatsoever. So it was quite remarkable that once NICE was created, 
having open methods of involvement and inclusion became the touchstone of the 
new organisation, because it wasn’t the touchstone of how it was created. Once 
Mike was appointed he was a roving ambassador doing huge amounts of work in 
individual meetings that at least ensured that there was no organised opposition. I 
think the colleges were a bit taken aback, not just by the money side, but by the fact 
that the new Labour government had jumped onto a piece of turf that they might 
have considered theirs before.  
 
But they were too late at organising themselves on that, there were some 
discussions that they would set up NICE themselves and it would be truly at arms-
length from government because it wouldn’t be a government institution. But I don’t 
 
9 BMA: British Medical Association, representative and negotiating body for UK doctors. 
10 BMJ: British Medical Journal, scholarly journal 
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think that proposal came forward until we had actually got the full draft regulations 
and they were about to be laid before parliament, it was far too late.  
 
[31:23] NT: Right, and that sort of leads into the next bit, which in the creation period 
– Labour government – which of the politicians do you see as being most influential 
in the creation of NICE? 
 
[31:40] DP: Well, my recollection of the period was that the actual detailed work to do 
the creation was very technocratically driven by key civil servants, Clive Smee in 
particular and through Clive to his network of contacts. The political advisors were 
active, and from time to time Alan Milburn was and the Secretary of State was to a 
degree, but not in the design work really.11 They were involved in the decision that 
such an institution should come into being, but not really in the boundary definitions 
of its work, and there was huge debate about the technology appraisal programme 
and the rationing questions, and the cost effectiveness questions, and there was 
political endorsement that that debate should happen, but not necessarily political 
drive and leadership saying ‘and once you have had your debate the answer should 
be such and such’.  
 
[32:50] NT: Right 
 
[32:50] MR: That’s about right, I mean one of the great things was when we were 
setting up NICE was that really they let us get on with the job and didn’t interfere.  
 
[33:02] NT: Right, that’s jumping into the next section which we will get to in just a 
moment. At one level it seemed to me that quite a lot of ministers had a bit of a hand 
in this, because, Mike you have recalled that Margaret Jay at one point said to you 
could the Committee on the Safety of Medicines do cost effectiveness?12 
 
[32:25] MR: That’s right 
 
 
11 Alan Milburn, Minister of State for Health at this time (1997-98). The Secretary of State 
was Frank Dobson (1997-99). Milburn went on to hold that office in 1999-2003. 
12 (Baroness) Margaret Jay was also a Health Minister at the time. The Committee on the 
Safety of Medicines, a government advisory committee, was chaired by MR (1993-98). 
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[32:25] NT: Graham Winyard has this account of sitting in Milburn’s office trying to 
set out what could be a departmental regulatory approach to quality and cost 
effectiveness, and what could be the professional bit, that was one of the bits from 
which NICE came.13 Clive has recalled debates, as David has said, over all the cost 
effectiveness stuff, and saying when you ask questions like ‘is this likely to increase 
the NHS drugs bill or decrease it?’ the honest answer was ‘we haven’t got a clue – 
we think it will lead to more rational expenditure, but we don’t know whether it will 
mean more expenditure or less expenditure’. So David’s point that the technical 
design sat within the department and with the civil service is probably very valid isn’t 
it? 
 
[34:13] TJ: Just on that point about cost savings, I am looking at a quote here from 
Michael Rawlins in the Times from May 27th 1999, and he said ‘anyone who believes 
that NICE will reduce NHS expenditure is whistling in the wind.’ How right! 
 
[34:32] NT: Indeed, indeed. Well, Paul, Sally, I was proposing to move onto the next 
bit, which is the first months of NICE, unless there is anything else you would like 
covered? 
 
[34:49] SS: Yes, it’s going really well, thank you everybody, we are getting some 
nuanced debate here about some things that we thought were quite straightforward. 
 
[34:58] NT: So, let’s move into the first months, the actual sort of making of NICE. 
How far did you feel that a lot of it had actually been laid down by the department, 
and how much did you feel that you were actually inventing this from scratch? 
Because there were bits in the white paper, in the regulation, like a Partners’ Council 
for example, so it’s a question of how much did you have to make it up, and how 
much was a blueprint there? I guess we should start with Mike and Andrew for that. 
 
[35:34] MR: To start with, we just knew the programmes that we were expected to 
undertake, it was both health technology assessment [HTA] in terms of cost 
effectiveness, but also guidelines. Right from the very beginning I always thought the 
guidelines were critically important, and so the first board meeting we only had two 
items on the agenda; first was the appointment of the chief exec, the second was the 
appointment of the chairman of the appraisal committee.14 It was slightly awkward 
 
13 Graham Winyard, Deputy Chief Medical Officer at DH 




because our statutory instrument, or whatever they were called then, indicated that 
although it was a board decision, the appointment of both those posts was to be 
agreed beforehand with the Secretary of State, and so we did that, we did that and 
there was no argument and at the meeting I remember saying that there really can’t 
be that much discussion about this, went into how the appointment had been 
considered, and would we please appoint Andrew Dillon - we start tomorrow and 
without a chief exec we are in trouble, and they all did the decent thing and agreed, 
and Andrew came and joined the meeting. Remember that Andrew? 
 
[37:14] AD: Yes I do, yes. 
 
[37:18] NT: Andrew, what attracted you to the job? You were running St George’s, a 
big teaching hospital and a very senior post, what was it that made you want to apply 
to join this entirely nascent body? 
 
[37:34] AD: Well, by then I had been at St George’s15 for about eight years or so, and 
I had been thinking about what comes next: do I carry on for another eight years or 
some indefinite period or do something different? I had decided that I wasn’t 
particularly interested in the commissioning side of how the NHS was organised at 
the time, so the obvious option would have been to move on to another trust chief 
executive role. So I suppose that was what I had been thinking, until the job at NICE 
was advertised. To go back to the earlier conversation, I had not heard about NICE 
until I saw the advert in the paper, and I don’t think much of the debate about the 
need for a national body, or approaches to more forensic and objective ways of 
making decisions about new treatments and services, had filtered much into the 
management system in the NHS. Though it might have done, it may just have been 
that I just hadn’t picked it up.  
 
When the NICE job was advertised I was attracted to it because although I hadn’t 
thought about doing something radically different, it just seemed really interesting. In 
those days nobody talked about ‘start-ups’ in the way they do now, but I guess it had 
the feel of a start-up. It was so different, it was a completely new organisation. I do 
remember being intrigued by the idea, not so much about the drugs side of it, but just 
the general notion that this would be a national point of reference on decisions that 
as a hospital chief executive you would get embroiled in all the time. So much of that 
debate – in the time when I was a hospital chief executive – took place in the almost 
 
15 St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust in south west London 
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total absence of objective information that both sides could share in order to reach a 
decision.  
 
The idea that there could be some national point of reference on new things  just felt 
good. I suppose the other thing was that having done twenty five years of my career 
in hospital management, which is a pretty stressful role, , and the idea that I could 
step out of that and do something different, but that was so connected into the world 
that I was familiar with, and something at a national level too, was intriguing.  
 
[40:38] NT: Where did David Barnett come from?16 
 
[40:45] MR: He applied to become chairman of the appraisal committee, when we 
started off we didn’t think of having more than one, so he applied. There was another 
applicant but David, and I didn’t know David, really at all, but I was particularly 
impressed that he was willing to forego being a Censor at the College of Physicians, 
which is sometimes a stepping stone to becoming president, to join us at NICE. I 
was impressed by that, and Frank Dobson agreed, and so we appointed him at the 
same board meeting that we appointed Andrew. 
 
[41:22] NT: Right, so in a sense you have covered the next question, which was 
‘what had been decided by the first board meeting of NICE?’ which was these two 
appointments had been made. Just to go back to how much did you have to invent 
question, it looks from the outside that the concept of the partners’ council was 
already there, there was a lot of stuff you could draw on from the Health Technology 
Assessment Programme, the work of the DECs and what have you, the QALY was 
there as a tool.17 Andrew has just talked about it being, effectively, a start-up. How 
much did you have to invent? 
 
[42:13]: My recollection was that the script from the technology appraisal programme 
was reasonably clearly set out, so the methods and processes were sufficiently 
evolved to allow that programme to start quite quickly. That wasn’t the case with the 
guideline programme. Mike mentioned earlier that there was the question of how that 
programme was going to be resourced, with money that had to be pulled back from 
the colleges and then reinvested, and that reinvestment required the creation of 
 
16 David Barnett, inaugural chair of the appraisal committee (1999-2009), consultant 
cardiologist 
17 HTA Programme, established by the NHS R&D programme in 1993. QALY: Quality 




collaborating centres, which were going to form the principle resource for developing 
the guidelines. All of that took much longer, and it wasn’t until really the back end of 
1999 that I remember there was an ordered, organised approach to all that. David 
will remember, because of course David came in pretty early on to support the 
development of that programme along with Peter Littlejohns at the time.18 The other 
thing of course was, it was one thing to have a theoretical approach to doing those 
things and producing those products, but we needed to recruit people and organise a 
team and have a structure and a way of working that both internally and also in 
terms of all the external engagement that would allow us to generate something that 
people can have a look at. 
 
[43:45] NT: David, you have your hand up… 
 
[43:45] DP: Yes, I was going to say, picking up those points from Andrew, I think the 
core technology, if I can call it that, of technology assessment, the methodological 
technology, and in fact to some extent the core technology of guidelines 
development, existed out there, but what didn’t exist and was no part of what the 
department handed over, was the both governance in organisational terms, and the 
governance in terms of all the mechanisms for stakeholder engagement that were 
built on top of that. As Andrew says, they were working in partnership with the 
colleges to produce something which would at the end of the day be an official NHS 
guideline, rather than a guideline published by the Royal College of whatever. We 
had no track record to pick up on doing any of that, it all had to be invented, and I 
think it was invented. The department didn’t hand over to Mike and Andrew any sort 
of blueprint for how to do the operations of the organisation, except that a couple of 
appointments had to be made and there had to be a partners’ council. The rest was 
built, the actual organisation, really from when Andrew was actually starting or about 
to start, and operating via remote control from St George’s. 
 
[45:18] NT: Tony? 
 
[45:18] TC: I don’t think, I certainly didn’t, realise until about 1999 the extent to which 
NICE was going to evolve in this sort of very open, multidisciplinary, multi-
professional sort of way, which in fact, it came to involve a very large number of 
people who essentially gave their time. I think the only reward was, at least in the 
early days, a first class ticket, subsequently it was only standard. Of course the real 
reward was very exciting company to be mixing with, and particularly for the 
 
18 Peter Littlejohns, Professor of Public Health, King’s College London, and founding Clinical 
and Public Health Director of NICE, 1999-2012. 
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academics - of which very large numbers were involved of course - particularly for 
the academics the idea that your participation was very close to policy. Most 
academics, unless they are political advisors or something, write stuff and it gathers 
dust, here was an opportunity for academics to get involved in the creation of and 
the implementation of policy, and I think that, I’m not quite sure how Andrew 
managed that, but it is something that as I say I don’t think I quite anticipated in the 
early days, just how exactly we were going to be dependent on this army of 
volunteers. I don’t think it is a mis-description to say that it was like an army of 
volunteers. Although that didn’t emerge in 1999 it became an implication of nearly 
everything that we decided in those early days, the whole business of stakeholder 
collaboration. 
 
[47:22] NT: Mercy? 
 
[47:23] MJ: I was going to say, I remember being on the Partners’ Council and a lot 
of the professional bodies, the presidents of the Royal Colleges, I remember that 
very soon the patient reps felt that we should get together and brief ourselves before 
meetings, because we felt out of our depth. Little did we know that all the Royal 
Colleges did as well, because when we talked to them individually, they weren’t 
talking to each other, whereas the patient reps were talking to each other. In fact, in 
those early days at Long Acre, NICE gave us a room to meet, just the patient 
organizations, so that we could prepare ourselves for Partners’ Council meetings, 
because we took them really, really seriously.19  
 
We started to feel that we were shaping an organisation, that we did have a voice. 
So we wanted to prepare ourselves, so I found it really quite interesting to get an 
insight into the professional organizations, who weren’t talking to each other, 
because I thought ‘they all know what is going on, and we don’t’ but actually it was 
the other way around. Because we were briefing ourselves, preparing ourselves, 
getting our list of questions out there, and actually quite early on Andrew produced a 
paper on patient involvement that we all commented on, that was very early on. So 
already we were getting the feel that this was a listening organisation. So that was 
quite important, in those early days of the partners’ council we really felt that we 
were shaping policy. 
 
[49:10] AD: Just going back to Tony’s point about the early and pretty extensive 
process of engaging with resources outside of NICE, and being open and 
collaborative. Some of that was just because we didn’t have enough money to do it 
 
19 Long Acre: London address where NICE’s office was situated at one time. 
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any other way. We had so little money at the time, we had to move quickly, and we 
weren’t confident that we could recruit people even if we did have the money. NICE 
was so new and the sort of people who had all the really strong technical skills might 
be rather hesitant about coming to a completely new organisation from wherever 
they might already feel secure, in the NHS or academia or industry. So being able to 
go out to a community  of willing collaborators, whether it was people in your 
community Tony, in health economics, or the huge array of other experts, who we 
needed  in increasingly large numbers in order to produce what we were doing, was 
really important.  
 
Mike, I know, particularly, from the start, was absolutely convinced that  the only way 
we were going to be credible with all those communities, would be to draw them into 
the development of our recommendations so that there would be a shared ownership 
of the things that we would be producing. 
 
[50:49]: Andrew, do you have a view on that? Andrew Stevens? 
 
[50:55] AS: I was very impressed with how Mike and Andrew got everybody involved, 
both from the moneymaking and the moneysaving, and also for getting people to feel 
that there was an ownership of it, that was a great success. My view of the whole 
thing comes as from an early committee member, either Mike or David Barnett asked 
me to become vice chair, which I was very privileged in sort of getting into the inside, 
as regards to the earlier question of whether people felt out of their depth, I have to 
say that the health economists did not feel out of their depth, Martin Buxton and Karl 
Claxton and the others, were very comfortable with what they did, and probably the 
more numerate physicians too, they felt very at home.20 
 
[51:50]: NT: Right. Trevor, how did this look from the industry’s perspective? They 
were on the partners’ council, did they feel it helped? 
 
[51:49] TJ: Let me first say, without sycophancy, that NICE has done an incredibly 
great job, for the last fifteen or more years. It has led the way in the world, and it has 
taught the industry actually that it has to get data, real-world data, to justify prices 
and so on, and in no small measure Tony, Andrew and Mike have led that. I just 
want to say that that’s where we are. But in those days, those uncertainties I 
mentioned earlier about delays, there was this fear that actually there would be 
 
20 Martin Buxton, Professor of Health Economics, Brunel University 1980-2014; Karl Claxton, 
Professor of Health Economics, University of York 
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leaks, and there were leaks, about what was going on, and provisional information 
was going out there, and that could really scare the horses in the marketplace and 
companies were saying ‘my share price is being affected’ because of uncertainty. 
What that led to was a lot of international chief executives saying ‘I’m not going to 
bother coming to Britain for a while, I’m going to get my product launched elsewhere 
while you sort this out’ and that meant that the patients weren’t getting the access to 
the new medicines.  
 
Indeed, and I quote here from the paper at the time, one of the big chief executives 
from one of our own companies, said, and this was over the uncertainty over beta-
interferon, that if you block that ‘we would certainly think about moving our 
headquarters operations out of England, and certainly we will consider investing far 
more overseas, and there is no overriding reason that we should be in the UK’. My 
concern as the director-general, with the chief executives of these companies, was 
‘we are producing an unstable area at a time when we are doing some really big 
advances in medical science’ the issue of the taxanes, women with breast cancer 
not getting the treatment here that they were getting in Europe, the fiasco over 
whether Relenza was cost-effective, how many communities, led us to this very 
unstable period.21  
 
Fortunately, by good discussion with Andrew, Michael and so on, the industry got out 
of that. I have to say that one of the sequalae of that was that the cost of bringing a 
drug to market almost doubled, because we realised that in order to get the right 
comparators in the right countries, you know, whatever was the benchmark in 
Germany might not be the same benchmark in the UK, then you have to do more 
and more patient comparisons, and you weren’t doing that to get more efficacy data 
or more safety data, but to get more data to put into the HTA appraisals, and that is 
just a fact of life. So those early days were very uncertain over whether we were 
going to lose the industry investment here, and hence the fruits of the research of 
our academic community, as well as whether patients were still going to get delays. 
That took a bit of time, but fortunately it got resolved by good discussion, and we 
have seen the fruits of it. 
 
[55:05] NT: Mike, Andrew, Tony, would you like to comment on that? 
 
 
21 Taxanes: class of chemicals forming active ingredient of some cancer drugs, such as 
Taxol, subject of NICE appraisals from c. 2001. Relenza: drug licensed in the UK for 
influenza, 1999, but not at first judged cost-effective by NICE (see pp. 22-23). 
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[55:10] MR: Not on that, but I just want to make a comment, back to the guidelines 
actually. The person who was extraordinarily helpful was Martin Eccles, and for a 
time we did actually have a guidelines advisory committee which perused each 
guideline as they were developed to ensure their validity.22 Martin was extremely 
helpful, and we should acknowledge that, and the value he was to us. 
 
[55:41]: AD: Yes, absolutely. 
 
[55:45] TC: The impression, I think, Nick that you seem to be getting is that there are 
huge amounts of uncertainty on both sides. From the industry’s perspective of 
course that was what it was, the professions or the clinical professions felt huge 
uncertainty as to what this meant. At NICE we didn’t know if it was going to work, 
nearly everything that we did, nearly all the things that we did have become topics of 
considerable interest in academic circles since, mostly health circles but not 
exclusively so, the whole business about deliberative processes, for example, more 
process-y type things that NICE essentially invented on the hoof. None of us were 
professionals on any of this, I don’t think we knew any professionals who could really 
advise us, the thing was tremendously risky from every perspective, people were 
taking different risks.  
 
I think that is another reason [for] the strategy of openness, stakeholder involvement, 
being honest about what we don’t know, what we need to know, how we are going to 
do things, having a system that enabled appeals to take place, to have a system that 
was reasonably transparent so that we could see what was going on, it was all… it 
all had a big snag of course which was that it was dreadfully slow, and that was a 
very difficult one that we tackled subsequently, but not in 1999 or 2000. 
 
[57:47] AD: Triggered partly by what Tony has just been saying, this a sort of 
contextual point. What I remember  is just how chummy everybody seemed to be. I 
had just stepped into a world of which I had absolutely no knowledge. I didn’t know 
anyone in the industry particularly, drugs were just another troublesome budget line 
if you are a hospital chief executive, I didn’t know anyone in the HTA world, at all. I 
had some knowledge of and a little bit of contact with people in the colleges, but in 
general this was a world I was unfamiliar with. Two things struck me; one was just 
how pleasant and polite people seemed to be generally with each other, and if you 
have been a hospital chief executive that is not necessarily an emotional 
 
22 Martin Eccles, chair of the Guidelines Advisory Committee, NICE; Emeritus Professor of 




environment that you are familiar with. So that was a big tick in the box for me, and 
the other thing I remember was just how much everybody liked Mike.  
 
I remember, Tony, those early meetings you chaired with the health economists and 
the clinicians who had knowledge of the evaluative methodology for looking at new 
drugs. I also remember meetings with college presidents or other college 
representatives at which and while everyone seemed to know Mike. Nobody knew 
me at all. For a  short period I felt as if I was just observing a team, rather than being 
part of it. I remember that quite vividly, and being hugely impressed, and actually 
quite relieved that there was someone (Mike) who had the right connections and who 
had a profile in all these communities that I knew were going to be so important to 
the early stages of building NICE and ultimately for its success. 
 
[59:54] MR: [Inaudible]… the College of Physicians, George Alberti was the 
president, and he was an old friend from Newcastle so that helped a lot.  
 
[1:00:06] MJ: Even the appeals committees were non adversarial, so those early 
days, when actually we were quite a small room anyway, so that differentiation 
between the panel and those presenting, there wasn’t, it was quite a, I suppose even 
though we were following process and things like that, I remember at the end of the 
digital hearing aids appeal, we were asking the person who was using them to 
demonstrate a bit, it was just more chummy. The big change was when I did the beta 
interferon appeal, when you had four barristers from all these different appellants, 
and things, this huge room, and it completely changed, it was much more 
adversarial. But I remember those early days when it was, you know, non 
adversarial, we were just trying to make sure people followed process, things like 
that. And then it kind of really changed over the years, that was one of the things, 
that kind of friendliness, getting on, even when actually you were on opposite sides 
of the table, then changed over the years.  
 
[01:01:27] AD: You’re right Mercy, I remember the first appeal was for the original 
decision on Relenza, and that was so friendly that when we had a break for lunch 
everyone just piled into the same room to eat sandwiches. And so there were people 
from Glaxo Wellcome there, people from NICE, and obviously other members of the 
appeal committee.23 Everyone was just sort of chatting happily about the events of 
the morning, ‘how do you think it’s going to go?’ and ‘do you think we’re going to 
win?’ It was really quite a collegiate sort of atmosphere. As you say, it was very 
different from  appeals as they eventually became, particularly after the lawyers 
 
23 Glaxo Wellcome were the manufacturers of Relenza 
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appeared, when the whole thing became highly structured, often very tense. 
Definitely lots of degrees of separation between participants at any break. It really 
was a very different atmosphere in those very early days.  
 
[01:02:37] NT: Trevor, in terms of relationship with the industry, I mean – Mike must 
have been known to the industry up to a point, because he had been with the 
[Committee on the Safety of Medicines], a long background in medicines regulation. I 
think you had known him for a long time. In terms of the chief executives of Glaxo 
and others, what was their view? 
 
[1:03:04] TJ: Well it wasn’t about the personalities. People knew Mike very well, and 
respected him, and of course his Newcastle days, a lot of us gave lectures and 
whatever. It was really the issue of what we called ‘NICE blight’. Despite all the good 
attempts and so on, whilst all these provisional information leaflets, the PADs were 
going out, people just put away their prescribing pens, and internationally people 
were saying ‘whoah, wait a minute – if there is going to be a problem, maybe we 
don’t do that’.24 And that wasn’t helped by, you know, definite leaks that occurred in 
that first year, particularly, about whether or not this was going to get approval. So it 
wasn’t about the personalities, it was about the process, which got tightened up. 
 
[1:03:56] NT: We have sort of touched on this a bit, but there is a question here: 
‘what went according to plan, and what was unexpected?’ 
 
[1:04:00] PA: Which is a good place for me to ask if we could just talk a little bit more 
about those leaks? I’ve heard how important they were to the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
 
[1:04:11] NT: Were you aware of them, Andrew Dillon? 
 
[1:04:15] AD: Leaks? About individual appraisals, you mean? I have a recollection of 
the first one.You probably remember this as well Mike, I can’t remember what the 
topic was now, but it was in the days when the consultation documents were 
confidential to the stakeholders.and there was a leak. I think it must have been the 
first time that it happened, because it seemed to be quite dramatic.There were all 
 
24 PAD: NICE’s Provisional Appraisal Decision, issued while the Appraisal Committee’s initial 
decision was out for consultation 
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sorts of concerns about what impact this might have on the commercial prospects of 
the company involved and so on.  
 
I remember the Department of Health became very concerned about it. Simon 
Stevens made it clear, that it was necessary to conduct a formal investigation to find 
out who had been responsible for the leak.25 I don’t know if you can Mike, but I can’t 
remember what the outcome was but I don’t think the culprit was identified. I was 
very impressed by the idea that you could get people in to work out who had spilled 
the beans, though. 
 
[01:06:23] MR: There was an inquiry. But I think they came to the conclusion that 
they didn’t know quite how it worked, but the other thing about leaks was, in the days 
which, as you say Andrew, the papers were confidential, was the problem of the 
extent to which releasing these documents was share-price sensitive. I actually went 
to see the chairman of the Stock Exchange, I forget who it was now, and I explained 
the problem and he said ‘you have got to be public, I can’t force you to be, but you 
have got to put them in the public domain, so that the stock exchange, stockbrokers, 
investors, can all have, in theory, access at the same time, rather than confidential.’ 
And that was I think, Andrew, when we stopped making them confidential. 
 
[1:07:13] AD: I think that’s right.  
 
[1:07:15] MR: I think it also stopped the problem of leaks! Because, you know, who 
wants to leak a non-confidential document! 
 
[1:07:24] TJ: I think it is useful to have that clarification. I am reading from an article 
in Chemistry in Britain from August 2000, where the leak, this was over the multiple-
sclerosis and beta-interferon glatiramer, ‘the leak came after NICE circulated its PAD 
to interested parties, patient groups, medical professionals and the manufacturers in 
mid-June. In a statement released shortly afterwards NICE blamed one of these 
groups for the leak.’ Then it goes on to talk about the need for transparency, which of 
course frightened us again about what information was going to go out there, and as 
Mike says would that be share price sensitive. I think all that was a really important 
lesson, and it all got tightened up, or we became less secretive, and that has worked 
very well. 
 
25 Simon Stevens, at this time Special Adviser at DH (1997-2001); Prime Minister’s Health 
Adviser, 10 Downing St Policy Unit, 2001–04; Chief Executive, NHS England, since 2014 
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[1:08:09] MJ: I remember when it came to the Patient Council [sic – Partners 
Council], the person and, Andrew said, ‘we should publish this and go open with it’, 
the only people that objected were the industry, the rest of the Partners’ Council 
were quite happy with that suggestion. Though I actually think that the leak came 
from a patient organisation, I am not completely sure but I think it was, who went to 
the papers with it, so yes. 
 
[1:08:44] NT: I bet the leak inquiry got nowhere, having been involved in a few of 
those and they don’t very often find out what happened. Are you happy with that 
Paul, can I move on? In a sense, we have almost touched on this – but what went 
according to plan, and what was unexpected, is the question here. I suppose one 
answer to that might be, in the first instance, Relenza, which was kind of both!  
 
[1:09:18] MR: Relenza was, of course, to start with Andrew’s baby, because he 
chaired, what did we call it at that stage?, the committee that did that, and then I 
chaired the appeal. That was in the summer of, we published I think in September or 
October, Glaxo was absolutely incandescent, particularly, Richard Sykes.26 Stormed 
into Downing Street and Tony Blair backed us, and said ‘I have set up NICE to make 
these difficult decisions and I am not going to interfere’.  That was a very important 
lesson actually, that there wasn’t going to be political interference in our decisions. 
Andrew, you will remember it very well. 
 
[1:10:19] AD: I certainly remember it and  it strikes me now that  one of the more 
bizarre aspects of the early days of NICE was that I was asked to chair an appraisal 
committee. Looking back on it, and it was you Mike that said ‘you’re the chief 
executive so you should do it’, and I am thinking, well I have absolutely no idea how 
to chair a scientific advisory committee. And it was in the end a one-off, because 
after I had done it I can remember you saying ‘it is really important that you never do 
this again.’ I think at the time I interpreted that as meaning that I had more important 
things to do with my time, as opposed to the fact that it had been such a disastrous 
experience that it was necessary never to put me in a position of doing it again! It 
was odd, but curiously very enjoyable, I remember the people who were on that 
committee, Andrew you were on that committee, weren’t you? The first rapid 





26 Richard Sykes: then Chairman of Glaxo Wellcome 
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AD: Anyway, the people on it were just extraordinary minds, and made it really easy, 
We had Rod Taylor, who was briefly the director of the appraisal programme, who 
was just very good at summarising evidence and drawing conclusions, or drawing 
people together in a conversation to reach conclusions. 
 
[1:12:00] NT: Andrew Stevens? 
 
[1:12:02] AS: Well, I can remember the details of the Relenza appraisal, Andrew 
chaired it very well, so it must have been that he was too busy, rather than that he 
had failed on that particular task. It exposed a lot of things; as I remember Glaxo/ 
GSK had put forward three big trials, all of which specifically excluded anybody at 
risk, and the appraisal was about the at-risk groups, it seemed almost sort of bizarre 
to the committee that anybody should have thought it would go otherwise, as we in 
effect had no data on the question in front of us.  
 
[1:12:44] NT: Anybody want to add to that? 
 
[1:12:48] MR: No, and I think Paul you have seen it, but we got support from the 
Times in a leading article.  
 
[1:13:02] PA: Not to mention Private Eye 
 
[1:13:05] MR: (Laughs) And Private Eye, yes 
 
[1:13:09] TJ: The initial decision, as I understood it, was ‘no’, and then eventually 
there was a further decision about selective groups, elderly people and so on.  
 
[1:13:20] MR: That’s absolutely right. A year later Glaxo came up with data showing 
its benefits in elderly people. 
 





[1:13:35] AD: Then the appraisal committee was chaired by David Barnett, and that 
positive decision, the change from the initial negative decision to the positive 
decision was as a result of David’s casting vote at the appraisal committee. 
 
[1:13:57] NT: Gosh 
 
[1:13:59] TJ: The difficulty is that obviously it is very nice to have a large population, 
well phenotyped and genotyped, to look at the benefit and risks and so on and 
efficacy of a product. We are seeing with the current COVID19 pandemic, that you 
have to take decisions with limited data, that may actually turn out not to be the right 
ones later. Somebody said last week in the press about the use of some of these 
early interventions, as yet not subject to major placebo/control studies, well nobody 
ever did a placebo/control study on parachutes! This is the difficulty, isn’t it, for 
regulators and for health technology appraisers, that where there is a real need for a 
product or a treatment, we mustn’t forget that NICE was much more than medicines, 
very, very importantly about different therapies. But where there is a need and 
there’s not enough data, then those difficult decisions have to be taken without 
having all the facts that you would really like to have.  
 
[1:15:10] AS: There is very good data on parachutes, it may not be an RCT, but the 
data is very good, and NICE would have passed them at the drop of a hat. 
 
[1:15:19] NT: Indeed, indeed. I wanted to go back slightly, and inject something 
which, from my point of view – I was a journalist covering this at the time – talking 
about the early days of NICE, talking about stakeholder engagement, I thought the 
handling of the media was exemplary. I would like to think that I understood what 
NICE was about from the beginning, because I covered the evidence-based 
medicine movement and what have you, but for a lot of my colleagues this was just 
terribly strange territory. This was the ‘rationing body’ and of course the Daily Mail 
still calls it the ‘rationing body’, but there was a huge amount of effort that went into 
trying to explain, via the media, what it was all about, and I think that was 
impressively successful, from my point of view, that’s just an observation. Two other 
things, I’ll move on in a second, David, at one point you said when we were talking 
about the involvement of ministers in the department, you said that the special 
advisers did get engaged, I presume that was Simon Stevens, is that right? 
 
[1:16:34] DP: Yes, I think, though I was talking about the stages before NICE came 
into being, there. I think the extent to which the department was involved or not 
involved after NICE was created was interesting as well. From the period when NICE 
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came into being until NICE’s independence being backed on the Relenza decision, I 
am not sure the department really wanted to let go. I particularly remember it 
because it was quite awkward for me, I had been in charge of the project to set up 
the organisation, and then I was sent out on loan to NICE, and I would be subject to 
phone calls from old colleagues who thought they needed to keep a grip on what 
was going on inside NICE, but I think eventually most civil servants realised that not 
being involved in NICE decision-making was what they needed, that was why it had 
been set up in the first place: to put a distance between the political machine of 
government and the decisions made on clinical cost-effectiveness. But I think even 
the department struggled with that up until, and probably beyond Relenza. And then 
there were the cancer drugs of course, which illustrated the department’s 
unwillingness to let go again, but that was later.  
 
[1:18:14] NT: And this is a really, really trivial point, that jumps back, Andrew Dillon, 
when you were appointed did you just apply to an ad or were there headhunters 
involved? 
 
[1:18:28] AD: I wasn’t contacted by headhunters – I found out about the job through 
an ad in the paper, but the application process initially was handled by headhunters. 
Just a thought on what David was just saying about the department, I must admit 
that I didn’t feel at all that the  department was sitting on NICE in any kind of 
unreasonable way in those early stages. I recognised that given it was a completely 
new entity in a pretty controversial high-profile area, that the department inevitably 
was going to take a close interest in how the organisation was going. But I certainly 
never felt that we were being unreasonably constrained or prevented from doing the 
things that we thought were necessary in order to keep the organisation going. If I 
reflect back over twenty years, I would say that the department was more actively 
engaged, if I can put it in those terms, in the operation of NICE, at the end of that 
twenty-year period, than they were at the beginning.  
 
[1:20:04] MR: The other person who was in the department who was very helpful, 
not critical – but helpful, was Simon Stevens. Both when he was at the department of 
health and when he went into No. 10. Nick and I were at some of those roundtable 
meetings with Tony Blair, do you remember Nick? 
 
[1:20:26] NT: Vaguely, yes. Vaguely. 
 




[1:20:35] NT: Right. And of course it was Simon who was instrumental in the funding 
directive, wasn’t he – when that came.27 
 
[1:20:45] SS: I wondered, you may have already talked about this, whether the 
permanent secretary had any direct interest or influence over NICE. This comes up 
because you talk about that period around 2000 when you have a change in perm 
sec. you had Chris Kelly in there from 1997-2000, and then Nigel Crisp comes in in 
2000, and is there until 2006 I think. Nigel has had a mixed press in terms of his 
capacities, and his oversight of what was happening in the various bits within the 
department, but what I am interested in is those external relations. Maybe we could 
have some reflection on Chris Kelly and Nigel Crisp, and their attitude, or is that 
beyond this group to speak to? 
 
[1:21:52] AD: Well I don’t really remember either of them taking much interest, 
although that is probably the wrong way of putting it – I am sure they were both 
interested – but neither of them engaged particularly with NICE, either strategically 
or operationally.  
 
[1:22:13] MR: I agree – neither of them. 
 
[1:22:16] AD: As you probably remember, Mike, and probably David as well,  was 
just how closely involved the ministers were - the secretary of state, and Tony Blair 
as well, personally, in NICE. So the contact we had with the department wasn’t really 
with officials at all, other than the sponsor team, the NICE handling team, on a day-
to-day basis. Beyond that all the contact for the really big issues and the strategic 
issues we were facing was with the special advisers and the ministers, direct.  
 
[1:22:52] MR: I completely agree Andrew.  
 
[1:22:58] PA: You have both referred to special advisers, plural. So there is Simon 
Stevens, surely not Joe McCrea, or was it?  
 
[1:23:08] AD: I can’t remember 
 
27 Funding Directive: Ministerial Direction to the NHS in 2002 that when a NICE appraisal 
found an intervention to be cost-effective, NHS organisations were to fund its use 
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[1:23:08] MR: There was a special adviser at Downing Street 
 
[1:23:10] PA: Robert Hill? 
 
[1:23:13] MR: Robert Hill, that’s right. So we had some discussions with him, yes. 
But mainly with Simon. 
 
[1:23:24] AD: And somebody called Chris Ham, I’ve got a vague recollection of, no 
idea what happened to him [laughter]28 
 
[1:23:32] PA: What about Robert Hill, can you recall anything about specific subjects 
you might have talked to him about? 
 
[1:23:37] MR: I can’t, no. Can you remember Andrew? 
 
[1:23:39] AD: No, I’ve got a much clearer recollection of the kinds of issues that 
Simon Stevens was involved in. For example, the decision that Simon took, or 
somebody took in the department but it came through him, to take away the 
responsibility that we had had originally for managing the national confidential 
enquiries, which were then transferred to the National Patient Safety Agency. 
Something that, Mike, that you might remember we really objected to at the time, I 
think we both felt strongly that it was a better fit with NICE, but they were, in those 
days, looking for functions to give the NPSA to do.  
 
[1:24:22] MR: Yes, we were disappointed when they moved it away. But in those first 
two or three years we also got John Grimley Evans to do a review of the confidential 
enquiry.29 
 
[1:24:34] AD: Yes, absolutely – I had forgotten that, so we handed them over in good 
shape.  
 
28 Chris Ham: Professor of Health Policy and Management, University of Birmingham; DH 
Strategy Unit 2000-2004 
29 John Grimley Evans: Professor of Clinical Geratology, University of Oxford; medical 
adviser to DH 
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[1:24:43] NT: Can I pause for a moment and ask Sally and Paul a question – if you 
look at the rest of the questions that are on your outline sheet, we have pretty much 
touched on all of them already, like ‘what it was like to work in the early days of 
NICE’ we have talked about the collegiate atmosphere and all that sort of stuff, 
purely personally I would be interested in some questions about some of the later 
period, but do you not want me to go there? 
 
[1:25:09] PA: No objection to you going there, if the participants will play along, 
please do. 
 
[1:25:16] NT: One bit that particularly interests me… 
 
[1:25:20] PA: I should say that we are going to have more witness seminars later, 
which will cover later times, but that’s fine 
 
[1:25:25] MR: The thing about the early days, Nick, was the antagonism between us 
and Richard Smith, who was the editor of the BMJ. Antagonistic pieces, ‘time for a 
new NICE’ was one of his headlines, or something like that. 
 
[1:25:48] NT: Yes, Richard was a key movement in the Rationing Agenda Group, he 
was deeply into ‘cut the cloth’.30 
 
[1:25:55] MR: Five years later he wrote another article, ‘Britain’s great gifts to the 
world; Newtonian physics…’ I can’t remember the other one, ‘… and NICE’ 
 
[1:26:04] NT: Yes, ‘the Beatles, Teletubbies and…’ I can’t remember, something else 
 
[1:26:07] MR: That’s right, ‘the Teletubbies…’ and NICE. And of course since then 
the BMJ has published summaries of our guidelines. Well, NICE’s guidelines, sorry – 
not our guidelines. 
 
 
30 Rationing Agenda Group: 1990s lobbying group, regarded rationing of health services as 
inevitable in the UK and promoted debate on how to undertake it. See Bill New, ed., 
Rationing: Talk and Action in Health Care (London: Wiley/King’s Fund, 1997).   
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[1:26:25] PA: It would be good to explore this a little bit more. Richard is a person 
who hasn’t agreed to be interviewed, so if anybody can shed light on why he felt the 
way he did, even second-hand, then that would be quite helpful. 
 
[1:26:38] MR: Why won’t he… is he embarrassed by his initial antagonism? Hostility 
to NICE? 
 
[1:26:45] NT: My view would be, you know, you have to remember end of the 1990s 
there was a real debate about rationing. And we have discussed what we mean, I 
share Mike’s view, rationing is giving everybody the same amount, but there was this 
debate about rationing. And some very, very senior, otherwise level-headed people 
were saying that the NHS would have to be restricted in some way. Chris Ham sat 
on a pharmaceutical-industry funded working party that Duncan Nichol, the ex-NHS 
chief executive chaired, of which Patricia Hewitt was the secretary, which was talking 
about how you might have to restrict the nature of the service in one way or 
another.31 Richard Smith was very involved in that, very involved in the Rationing 
Agenda Group, and looking back it was a very, very widespread view that we might 
have to constrain what the service did, in sort of serious ways. Richard was part of 
that, and if my memory of his very hostile early leaders in the BMJ were actually that 
this was actually quite a good idea but it won’t work. And it was a good idea because 
he thought it ought to be rationing services, and he didn’t think that would work. 
 
[1:28:14] MR: There was a group called the Rationing something Group [NT: 
Rationing Agenda Group], that’s right.  
 
[1:28:22] NT: There were quite level-headed serious people involved in that. 
 
[1:28:28] TJ: I remember having that conversation with Richard around that time, and 
he was concerned very much about the overall spend of the nation on the NHS. And 
that is reflected of course in his editorial of March 27th, 1999, in which he says 
‘centralised direction is a poor way of solving the NHS’ bigger problem: the amount 
of money available to spend.’ That was his mission. 
 
 
31 The group was called Healthcare 2000. Patricia Hewitt, then prominent in the Institute for 




[1:28:55] DP: I was just going to say that I think this applies to Richard, but some 
others who were around at the time as well, that there were commentators who were 
very keen and supportive of the fact that the agenda that NICE was tackling [what] 
needed tackling, in terms of our publicly funded health services, but by character and 
inclination, were not the kind of people who were comfortable about what NICE 
became, which was, inevitably, a large guidelines factory, a rather corporate beast, 
for all it might be open and inclusive, making singular decisions on behalf of society 
as a whole. These were very individualistic people, I found, in general, who were 
sounding off about these things. And there was no way we could ever do right by 
some of them. However elaborate and open our processes, because they weren’t in 
favour of there being a national guidelines factory that made decisions that they  
knew better about. 
 
[1:30:00] MR: Yes, that’s right. People would be embarrassed nowadays, but this 
business about ‘clinical freedom’ was tossed around quite often, and nowadays I 
don’t think people would dare talk about clinical freedom in that sort of way. 
 
[1:30:20] NT: Tony? 
 
[1:30:20]: TC Maybe not here, but what about the States? Mike, tell us some of your 
recollections of being mauled by the libertarians in the US 
 
[1:30:34] MR: Yes, particularly happened during the later stages of NICE, when on a 
number of occasions, a fair number of occasions, I travelled with minsters, initially 
with Norman Warner, who was very badly behaved, but that’s another story. I was 
brought along, in large part because NICE was controversial and he was trying to 
persuade American pharmaceutical companies, in particular, to invest in the UK. So I 
was brought along to explain what NICE was up to, what we were trying to do. 
Norman Warner was the first one I went with, he actually said on one occasion, ‘the 
real reason you are here, Mike, is you are my personal physician’ so I did make sure 
I had a few drugs with me, but that’s another story altogether really, my travels with 
ministers.  
 
[1:31:38] NT: If you are going to do more seminars on the later years 
 




[1:31:50] NT: Can I just pick up one thing that Andrew Dillon said just now, about 
relations with the department and how, in a sense, they have got more intrusive 
later, in the later years. Is that relations with the department or relations with NHS 
England?32 
 
[1:32:08] AD: Well they are connected, I think. The creation of NHS England 
changed NICE’s external relationships really quite fundamentally. Before NHS 
England the proxy for our understanding of what the NHS wanted from our guidance 
and its ability to action it , was informed in part by our contacts in the NHS but mainly  
it came through the Department of Health. With the creation of NHS England that 
changed completely. Not only did we have a new source for the NHS view on 
everything, but NHS England became the primary customer, or rather the single 
customer, for the majority of the appraisal programme, though not the guidelines 
programme.  
 
That changed the nature of the relationship that NICE had with the department in a 
couple of ways. To some extent it allowed the department to pull back a bit, because 
they didn’t need to do the things that NHS England was going to do, including 
commissioning some aspects of NICE’s work, and in relation to some of the practical 
issues around, for example the resource impact of the recommendations that we 
were producing. However, I think they quickly became conscious that they needed to 
be careful not to cede everything to NHS England, particularly in terms of the core 
methods that NICE was operating to, especially but not exclusively in the technology 
appraisal programme. This is because changes in NICE’s methods have both policy 
and fiscal consequences, in which the department has an interest and because, 
ultimately, NICE is still accountable to the Department, for the delivery of its 
mandate. So they needed to maintain their influence and ultimately, their control.  
 
I think there was a process of letting go and then pulling back of some of those 
influences, against the backdrop of the more complex dynamic between  the 
department and NHS England.. NICE sits sometimes uncomfortably between the 
Department and NHS England. I don’t mean it as a criticism, but the way that the 
department structures its relationship with NHS England can make NICE’s task more 
or less complicated. This results from the tension between what the department is 
responsible for and has to account for and what NHS England is responsible for, and 
what it sees as its accountability to parliament and the public should be.  NICE, 
 
32 NHS England, created in 2012, was the more arm’s-length successor to the NHS 
Executive, charged with the central direction of NHS activity  
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because of the significance of the relationship it has with NHS England and the 
department has to carefully triangulate its relationship with both organisations.  
 
Most recently, for the last couple of years or so that I was at NICE, that tension 
seemed to be heightened, partly because of the growing impact of extremely 
expensive new technologies being introduced into the NHS, partly as a consequence 
of the NHS’ growing capacity to undertake what it refers to as ‘commercial 
negotiations’. It was also partly because of the importance to the government of the 
country’s relationship with the pharmaceutical industry, as one of the ‘engines of the 
economy’ and because of Brexit and the immense nervousness around what is 
going to happen to the life sciences industry as the UK leaves the European Union. 
It’s a complex situation and NICE is right in the middle of it. I think that explains the 
growing attention to some of the methodological detail of NICE’s work on the part of 
the department, in recent years, compared to the more relaxed approach it was 
taking in the early and middle years of NICE. 
 
[1:37:18] PA: Could I ask what sort of forms that takes, that attention to the 
methodology? 
 
[1:37:22] AD: It’s almost always entirely constructive. 
 
[1:37:28] PA: I mean, topics for instance – is it the Highly Specialised Technologies 
programme, or is it XYZ? 
 
[1:37:35] AD: It’s almost exclusively in relation to the technology appraisal 
programmes, not just the HST programme. But also some other aspects of what we 
do too, including , the work NICE has started to do on evaluating digital health 
technologies, together with some aspects of the guidelines programme, because  of 
their resource  consequences for the NHS. The department  felt that it was its 
responsibility to help the NHS manage the financial consequences of some of the 
guidance that NICE produced. It wouldn’t suggest that the NHS shouldn’t do what 
NICE was recommending, but it was clear that it was acutely aware that in individual 
cases NICE was recommending the NHS to do things that it was conscious would 
stress the NHS budget in circumstances in which that budget, more generally, was 
under huge pressure. 
 
[1:38:45] NT: Andrew, specifically can I ask, I’m going to get the name for it wrong, 
but the relatively recent budget [impact] cap decision, ‘if a drug is going to cost more 
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than so much over the first three years, NHS England can ask NICE to 
recommend…’ was that, did that initiative, and the agreement around that come 
solely from NHS England or was the department involved as well? 
 
[1:39:09] AD: I don’t know whether the department was that involved in the early 
evolution of that concept. Clearly they became involved in it because ultimately they 
had to be a partner to the process that was eventually put into place, but its origins 
were in concerns that were being expressed by NHS England about some of the 
highly specialised technology decisions that were, by then, being taken. Both NICE 
and NHS England were also conscious of the need to avoid some of the difficult 
conversations that had started to emerge in the end stages of some appraisals. I felt 
the need to find a consistent approach to resolving those issues. Although each 
appraisal is unique, many of the end stage issues are sufficiently similar for there to 
be a protocol so that  the people working in both organizations had a frame of 
reference to  reach conclusions on them, rather than creating solutions from scratch 
on a case by case basis. The budget impact cap was the result of a conversation I 
had with Simon Stevens in the margins of a meeting, where we talked about the 
need for it and had an initial discussion about what the amount should be. 
 
[1:41:19] NT: Now, I have pulled this twenty years forward, which was probably 
slightly naughty of me, we did say we would have a break, but Paul, Sally, it seems 
to me that we have covered everything that was on your set of questions. 
 
[1:41:34] PA: Yes 
 
[1:41:36] NT: So, in that sense we could begin to wind up, before I do, I thought we 
would go round and ask anybody if they have anything they wish to say about these 
earlier days, that has not been said and that we should have addressed. Tony, we 
can start with you. 
 
[1:41:55] TC: One of the things we haven’t actually raised was research. Obviously 
one of the things that NICE’s processes were going to generate, was identify areas 
where more research needed to be done in order that future decisions would be 
better. We had a research director, I can’t remember whether we had one at the very 
beginning, we also had a research committee, and I think we also had an effective 
working relationship, although I wasn’t intimately involve with this at all, with the NHS 
R&D programme, where our priorities for research could be fed in and so on, I used 
to chair the research committee, which had a lot of very distinguished people on, 
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people like Iain Chalmers and a whole bunch of household names in the modern 
medicine, modern research.33  
 
There was a lot of pressure, I seem to recall, from that committee, that NICE ought 
to have a research strategy, and I don’t think we ever did have a research strategy in 
any overall sense, perhaps we got one after I had gone, but it seemed to me to be 
an area that was pragmatically resolved, probably reasonably satisfactorily, but not 
fully satisfactorily until the other national institute was created in which I gather NICE 
interests are well - I don’t know whether this is a correct impression- are well-
represented. However, in those early days it seemed to me that we struggled a bit 
with the idea of where, what our role in research priorities, research funding even, 
should be. I don’t know whether Mike or Andrew, you have got some reflections on 
that? It seemed to me to be a slightly messy area. 
 
[1:44:04] AD: I always think that there were two aspects to the research NICE should 
engage in; one was ‘how do we connect the uncertainties that arise in the production 
of individual pieces of guidance, with research funders - whether that was the 
publicly-resourced research funders or industry in individual cases?’ The other was 
‘what role does NICE have in  conducting research relevant to its methods and 
processes?’: how do we do better at gathering and interpreting evidence and turning 
it into something useful for the system?  
 
Initially I think in both cases they were part of Peter Littlejohn’s remit, Peter was 
appointed as the clinical director of NICE, and I confess I don’t think it engaged 
much with me, at first, in terms of being an important part of the management 
agenda. I don’t think that we focused a lot on making sure that we had effective 
relationships with the MRC, with the NHS R&D system or with other research 
funders, I just assumed that that happened, that it was part of the process. As it 
turned out, and Mike probably may be able to talk about this,  it didn’t seem that we 
were doing particularly well in that respect for quite a long time. The research 
questions that I had assumed were forming an important part of the agendas for 
research funders, weren’t really being picked up.  
 
Partly, I think this was simply because we weren’t formulating the questions in a way 
that those funders could take into account , in the way they applied their criteria to 
judgements about how to apply their funding. In relation to our own methods and 
processes, I’m not sure how active we were in promoting things that were puzzling 
 
33 Iain Chalmers: Director, 1992–2002, UK Cochrane Centre, which publishes evidence 
reviews on effectiveness of treatments 
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us. I wonder if partly that was because so many of the methodologists that were 
practising and researching in the areas that were of interest in the evolution of our 
processes and methods, were already involved in NICE.  were themselves taking the 
initiative, through their own arrangements for seeking research funding, to address 
the sort of questions that we would have wanted to have answered anyway.  
 
[1:47:05] MJ: I remember being on the subcommittee with Peter Littlejohns, myself, 
Ruth Carlyle, and Richard [surname unknown]…who’s a very-well known researcher, 
can’t remember who he was.34 But I can’t even remember what we were discussing, 
it was a research advisory- kind of group, but there were only about four of us on it, 
but that was early days, that was before I even joined the board. I also remember 
those recommendations we used to make at appeals, because I was on the hip 
appeal, and I remember even that, that was twenty years ago, saying that there 
should be, one of our recommendations was a hip registry, so that was one of them 
– but I don’t think there was any follow-up, I wasn’t aware of any. 
 
[1:47:58] TC: It might be worth your while to do a little bit of follow-up conversation 
with Peter Littlejohns, it is an important area. I think it did get resolved in the end. 
 
[1:48:15] AD: I think it did, yes. 
 
[1:48:16] PA: We have certainly talked to Peter, a couple of times now, and this was 
one of the things that he wanted to talk about. He made one interesting point, which 
was that the NHS R&D programme were rather hostile to any other NHS body 
having its own budget for research, which it controlled itself. They felt, under Sally 
Davies, that they should be making all the strategic decisions about research 
investment.35 
 
[1:48:40] TC: Yes. There’s an interesting story to be told there, I think. 
 
[1:48:51] NT: Before I round up, can I just raise one more thing; almost inevitably 
when it comes to NICE we end up talking about health technology assessment, and 
there is  a huge guidelines programme. One of the things I found very mildly 
entertaining at the very beginning was that the first decision was Relenza, and there 
 
34 Ruth Carlyle: Head of NHS Library and Knowledge Services, East of England and the 
Midlands for Health Education England 
35 Sally Davies: Director of NHS R&D, 2005-15; Chief Medical Officer 2011-19 
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was this almighty row, and then NICE produces its first guideline, and it’s on 
‘impacted wisdom teeth’, it was like one extreme to the other. 
 
[1:49:25] MR: That was a technology appraisal, not a guideline 
 
[1:49:26] NT: …and it might save five million pounds a year, it was mildly 
entertaining. 
 
[1:49:37] PA: Everybody is complaining that you have got this wrong, Nick 
 
[1:49:42] MR: The wisdom teeth was the first proper appraisal, it wasn’t a guideline 
 
[1:49:48] NT: Oh right, sorry – my apologies.  
 
[1:49:50] MR: The first guideline was actually on schizophrenia.  
 
[1:49:54] NT: Right, and again I don’t know how far you want to go into this, Sally 
and Paul, but relatively early on, 2000/2002 we are back into beta interferon and the 
decision not to recommend it. My memory may be at fault, but there was a huge row 
about that, and direct action by patients so that, I think for the first time, NICE found 
its offices being picketed, members of the appraisals committee were bombarded 
with views and information, and I remember when I was doing the short history, 
some of the members from that said that the hostility kind of left scars, was that the 
first time, we have talked about how good early relations were with all the various 
stakeholders at the beginning, but beta interferon was a change of tone, was it not? 
 
[1:51:02] AD: Yes, I think you’re right, Nick. There were all sorts of things going on 
with protests outside the board meetings. I seem to remember we had to send Mike 
out with cups of tea at one point to placate groups of protesting patients. The other 
thing I remember is was that the rather collegiate, friendly, respectful atmosphere 
that connected NICE to its stakeholder groups, did change a little. For the first time I 
remember  difficult exchanges with a patient group, the MS Society. And also  a 
rather hostile discussion with a manufacturer of one of the beta-interferons. So you 
are right, it was a moment when it was brought home to us we realised that these 
were extraordinarily important decisions with big impacts, and that the nature of 
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those impacts could generate a rather different atmosphere and response to what 
we had been used to up to that point.  
 
[1:52:29] SS: Can I just follow up on that, Andrew, and ask whether there was a 
conscious revision of comms strategy, when you got that reaction to beta interferon? 
 
[1:52:40] AD: No, I don’t think so, no. There were changes through the years in 
NICE’s approach to comms. Nick was very charitable in his remarks about NICE’s 
approach to the media, and we certainly tried to be as open as possible, but we were 
cagey in other circumstances, and we were also a little bit on the back foot when we 
put consultation documents out in the early years. We wouldn’t do any proactive 
comms at all, because we thought that would be inappropriate because we would be 
somehow constraining the freedom of stakeholders to reflect on what we were 
saying and to send their comments back to us. I think that was unlikely actually, and 
so it has turned out to be. But I’m aware that it was very frustrating for the media, 
because they weren’t able to talk to the organisation that was putting out the 
communications, relying on the  press announcements that we made at consultation. 
So most of messages  that they were getting were coming from our stakeholders, 
and that was clearly something that we had to fix. That happened much further down 
the track. I don’t think that the beta interferon experience particularly changed our 
approach to comms. 
 
[1:54:04] NT: I would agree with what you have just said about the changing nature 
of the relationship with the media, something definitely changed. Sally, Paul, do you 
think you have what you were hoping to get from this first session, and if you are 
happy, I will just go round and say does anybody want to raise anything we have not 
covered, add anything, and at that point we will wind up, does that makes sense? 
[General agreement]. 
 
[1:54:32] SS: That sounds like a good idea from my perspective, but Paul is the one 
who is driving this, so I will leave Paul to give the substantial comment. 
 
[1:54:38] PA: I think that we have got what we wanted, and a lot more – thank you 
everybody.  
 




[1:54:46] TJ: Yes, I would like to know from Mike whether it was fortuitous that NICE 
was created on All Fools’ Day in 1999? [Laughter] 
 
[1:54:59] MR: It wasn’t a planned date, it just happened 
 
[1:55:03] PA: David knows about this, it’s a civil service thing, it’s the start of the 
year, isn’t it? 
 
[1:55:09] DP: Yes, it was a planned date actually. It was the date all the strands of 
work flowing from the Labour white paper were meant to deliver. In fact, NICE was I 
think the only one that delivered from that date. But yes, it was an interesting date 
and I remember, I think we met that evening in the basement at Covent Garden, and 
we had got these empty premises hadn’t we, and a board that had been appointed, a 
chief executive that was still working elsewhere for the next couple of months, and it 
all felt quite, it was All Fools’ Day, and it felt quite unreal.36 
 
[1:55:58] NT: Yes, I can’t remember which one it was but I know there is one NHS 
body that when it was set up insisted that it started on April 5th rather than April 1st so 
it didn’t fall on All Fools Day 
 
[1:56:10] MJ: I went to our first partners’ council meeting on the first of April as well, I 
remember meeting Andrew and finding out that he was the chief exec of my local 
hospital, which I was quite impressed with. 
 
[1:56:22] NT: So, Mercy is there anything you would like to raise or add that we 
haven’t covered? 
 
[1:56:26] MJ: No, I think we have covered most of the things 
 
[1:56:29] NT: Tony? 
 
[1:56:29]: No, nothing more  really. 
 
36 Covent Garden: NICE’s first office premises 
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[1:56:32] NT: Andrew? Andrew Stevens? 
 
[1:56:38] DP: There was one thing I wanted to say about the guidelines programme, 
which has been mentioned a few times, and I think much of our discussion has been 
as relevant to the guideline programme as the technology appraisals, though 
technology appraisals have tended to be the more memorable examples. I think one 
of the most surprising things about NICE is that the definitive statement on the 
management of patients with schizophrenia, or asthma or whatever, NICE has 
usurped the leadership of the medical royal colleges, albeit binding them into the 
process, but nevertheless taking away their independence on the best practice in the 
management of the major medical conditions that drive the health service and health 
in the country. That seems to have gone almost unremarked, which I think is 
astonishing. I could say it is just because there weren’t such big cash figures so 
obviously attached, but surely it represented quite a fundamental change in public 
policy in our society. It’s happened, and I am pleased it has happened, I am just 
surprised it happened so easily. Not a single guideline was publicly opposed by a 
royal college. 
 
[1:58:12] MR: Well of course the colleges are instrumental in producing them – have 
been and still are. But the problem with the guidelines when NICE was set up was 
that it wasn’t just the royal colleges who were producing them, all sorts of 
organizations were producing them, and many of them were complete rubbish. That 
was really the reason why NICE took over the  responsibility of doing guidelines. 
 
[1:58:42] NT: Yes, and I would make the observation that although colleges were 
doing guidelines ahead of NICE, they were, different colleges took it with different 
degrees of seriousness, and ability, quality. I mean, some of them were not very 
good, even though the had the royal college imprimatur. Andrew Stevens, sorry you 
were muted when I came back to you last time 
 
[1:59:07] AS: Yes, and my unmute button is a very weak one. A couple of things, 
perhaps this is off centre, if you don’t want me to go into it, one on roots, you asked 
about the Conservatives, and of course institutionally they had little to do with it, with 
NICE, at the beginning, but the whole atmosphere of the need for evaluation, the 
need for there to be better value for money, and above all with the purchaser 
provider split, all had its origins in their day, so because of the purchaser provider 
split there were a lot of people in the NHS and in universities who became much 
more interested in the NHS being cost effective than they would have been without 
that. So their hand was there in a sort of diffuse way.  
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The other thing I just wanted to chip in, I was out of the room for a bit, one of the 
questions you asked was about the balance between a health economics tool and 
social value judgements, and my impression was that sort of emerged from the 
committee structure. There was thirty-odd committee members ranging from die-
hard health economists, to people who had none of it. A lot of people in the middle, 
and sort of the balance mostly reflected that a group of that number of people 
couldn’t come to a consensus without a bit of laxity, that was then rationalised into 
social value judgements, which then of course made their way into the NICE system 
as an official document. So I think it was sort of learning on the hoof, also a 
combination of the types of people who were on the committees in the first place. 
 
[2:00:44] NT: That reminds me of something we should have talked about, which is 
the Citizens’ Council37 
 
[2:00:51] PA: Except that I want to have a whole witness seminar about that, the 
public. But can I follow up that fascinating comment that Andrew has just made, 
because this is one of my real sort of research interests, and I wonder what Tony 
makes of Andrew Stevens’ comments that it is happenstance, the balance of who is 
in the committee. 
 
[2:01:12] TC: I don’t know, I don’t doubt that what he said was right. I tend to see it, I 
think there were several converging lines of thought. The board had certainly been 
thinking about this sort of thing,  the board had a presentation, we had one of the ‘not 
for public’ meetings, internal seminars, when I talked explicitly about the nature of 
the ethical value judgements that our activities were necessarily involving, and so we 
had quite a long discussion of the nature of these social value judgements, the 
construction of the QALY for example, and the board had a reasonably good grasp 
of these sorts of issues, I can’t actually remember exactly how the citizens’ council 
got defined and created, I will have to rack my memory, and you are going to help us 
do that anyway, in the near future.  
 
[2:02:27] MR: Also Tony, remember that you and I wrote the paper for the BMJ on 
‘NICE and its social value judgements’.38 
 
 
37 Citizens Council: a group established by NICE to advise it on the social values which 
should inform its work 




[2:02:32] TC: We did. We did, and I think there were several things that were 
bubbling away that eventually led to both the idea of social value judgements and 
being explicit about that, and the creation of the citizens’ council, they had a common 
political philosophy almost. Necessarily much more than just health technology 
appraisal, much more than just medicine, so it took us into a much broader field and 
started involving a broader field of external people as well, that we… Peter 
Littlejohns certainly pursued this very thoroughly subsequently, and there is still an 
active couple of groups of which he is a – if not ‘the’ – member. I myself have taken 
a continuing interest in it as well. I look forward to having that discussion. 
 
[2:03:44] PA: Can I come back to Andrew Stevens, and ask you which committee in 
particular you were thinking about when you talked about balance? 
 
[2:03:50] AS: Happenstance was too strong a word – and I know that the board was 
having these discussions. I also wrote a paper, with Mike Rawlins, which was on our 
deviation from the threshold, and we, Mike and I, constructed that into a post-hoc 
rationale of why we were not strict adherents to the threshold in every case. I have to 
say, actually, in practice the threshold and the incremental cost effectiveness ratio in 
the appraisal committees was the sort of starting point and the strongest determinant 
of decisions. As to the ‘which committee?’ there was only one appraisal committee to 
start with, then we had two, and I was on the one, and I was also on the two when 
there were two. So it was all before it became four.  
 
These things had sort of hardened, and they had hardened both into the papers that 
we wrote for publication, and in the sort of methods guide, and there was, obviously, 
it wasn’t a thought-free zone, it wasn’t happenstance in that sense, it was just that 
the tension between wanting to ever prevent, to ever have an untenable opportunity 
cost, but also to not appear unreasonable with patient groups who get a hard deal. 
That tension evolved, you know, in a fairly rational way, into the sort of flexibility, 
founded on health economics in the first place, though, that evolved, but early 
committees more than the later ones, because obviously that is when the thinking 
had had the biggest hole to fill. 
 
[2:05:42] TC: These are still active issues, both the notion of a threshold, or multiple 
thresholds, is something under tremendous international discussion still today, and is 
of critical importance to countries trying to set up universal health coverage by public 
insurance. And similarly the notion that cost effectiveness may be necessary but it is 
hardly a sufficient criterion for determining what is going to go into a publicly insured 
package, so there is quite a good book coming out by Richard Cookson, towards the 
end of this year, which is a really serious attempt to integrate the equity concern that 
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lots of people have, including our own government, in economic appraisals, so it is 
still very active stuff.39 I think NICE, one of the things that NICE has undoubtedly 
done, not only nationally but internationally, is to raise these as issues that need to 
be discussed, and they are, actively, still. 
 
[2:06:56] AD: I agree with that, I was just going to say, listening to Andrew, the two 
enduring questions that people have put to me in my time at  NICE, are firstly, ‘why 
is the cost effectiveness threshold twenty to thirty thousand pounds?’ and secondly 
‘why hasn’t it changed?’ The first of those two questions I have been asked almost 
for the entire twenty years, and the second for about the last fifteen years. I look 
forward to Richard Cookson’s book. 
 
[2:07:36] PA: I look forward to interviewing Andrew Dillon and Andrew Stevens, who 
are on the list but we haven’t had one-to-one interviews with yet. 
 
[2:07:45] NT: David, David Pink, do you have anything to add on these early years 
that we have not covered, that we should have covered? 
 
[2:07:57] DP: No I don’t think so, I think we have covered it quite well. I think the 
most astonishing thing about the early years was that we survived them.  
 
[2:08:11] NT: Andrew, same question to you – anything we should have talked about 
in the early years that we haven’t talked about? 
 
[2:08:20] AD: Not really, only – just an observation, which isn’t so much about the 
early years, but the totality of NICE, that is that so much of the culture that NICE 
developed and indeed many of the principles that still endure in the way it goes 
about running its current array of programmes, were formed in those very early days.  
They are a product of the people who were around then, the way they thought, and 
you can sort of trace some of the ways in which NICE sets up new programmes now  
back to decisions that were taken in the early days about the right way to go about 
bringing evidence together, interpreting it and producing something useful from it. 
 
 
39 R Cookson, S Griffin, O F Norheim, A J Culyer (eds.), Distributional Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis: Quantifying Health Equity Impacts and Trade- Offs, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, Handbooks in Health Economic Evaluation Series, 2020). 
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[2:09:19] NT: Mike, anything we should have raised about the early years that we 
haven’t? 
 
[2:09:23] MR: No, I think we have covered most of the ground.  
 
[2:09:30] NT: Well in that case if Paul and Sally are happy, I will draw this to a close. 
It has been absolutely fabulous to see you all, and it will be even better when we can 
all have a drink at some point. 
 
[2:09:45] SS: We owe you all a big one, thank you very much 
 
[2:09:47] NT: Thank you very much indeed for your time, hope you felt it’s 
worthwhile. 
 
 
 
